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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the requirement of Section 3 of the Act, will emphasize
the extent to which informal dealings may be conducted
with the Government that centers in Washington.
RALPH F. FUCHS*
A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY. By
Eugene V. Rostow., New Haven: Yale University Press.
1948. Pp. xvi, 173. $2.50.
One of the large modern buildings in Washington, D. C.
is the Standard Oil Building, located part way between the
Capitol and the White House. If it does not house a formal
branch of the Government, from it has nevertheless eman-
ated a powerful influence on our national affairs, foreign
and domestic.2 Professor Rostow's book, however, is not
so broad as its title would indicate. "A National Policy for
the Oil Industry" is concerned with the organization of the
industry, the economic effects of that organization, and
the cure for the economic ills resulting therefrom. Basic-
ally, it is an amply documented indictment for violation of
the antitrust laws of the major oil companies, the
oil-producing states, and the Department of the Interior.
Professor Rostow's Brandeisian premise is that it is
"easier to achieve the values of democracy in a society
where economic power and social prestige are more widely
distributed, and less concentrated, than in the United States
today." 3 It follows that if the oil industry could be made
to fit a more competitive pattern of organization, without
loss of the economic and social values that its present
structure affords, action should be taken to adapt the in-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. Member
of U.S. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure, 1938-41.
1. Professor of Law, Member of the Graduate Faculty of Economics,
Yale University.
2. See, e.g., Tarbell, "History of the Standard Oil Company" (1904);
Nevins, "John D. Rockefeller: The Heroic Age of American Enter-
prise" (1940); Feis, "Petroleum and American Foreign Policy"
(1944); Feis, "Seen From E.A." 93-192 (1947); Schuman, "Inter-
national Politics" 280-81 (2d ed. 1937); New York Post, Feb.
27, 1948, p. 6; Hearings before H. R. Committee on Judiciary on
Charges against the Attorney-General, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922);
Hearings before Senate Committee Investigating the Attorney-
General, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923).
3. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" xiii (1948).
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dustry to the new pattern. He concludes "that the oil in-
dustry is monopolistic in its organization to an important
extent; that a more competitive form of organization would
be economically and socially desirable, and should be avail-
able as a practical matter under the construction of the
Sherman Act which has recently been developed by the
courts; and that a reorganization of the industry in the
interest of competition would not involve giving up the
economies of the large scale of production, or other tech-
nological advantages, but should on the contrary result in
the elimination of important wastes associated with the
excessive size and monopoly.1) 4
The indictment is drawn against some twenty-one of
the major companies in the oil industry, vertically inte-
grated and operating in all four phases of the business.
The largest of these remains the Standard Oil Company
(New Jersey), with over two billion dollars in assets.5 These
companies own about 30% of the producing wells and pro-
duce about 62% of the crude oil,6 they own over 70% of
the proved reserves of oil in this country,7 82% of the
refining capacity, about 90% of the oil tankers and 97%
of the pipe lines," 73% of the oil storage facilities,1° 40%
of the service stations,11 and have binding contracts with
80% of the wholesale jobbers of oil.12 In addition, these
same interests control 75% of the proved reserves in South
America, 40% of the proved reserves in the Middle East,
and 30% of the proved reserves in the Far East.13 It is
this group that has imposed on the American economy a
policy of planned scarcity for the purpose of maintaining
an artificially high price.
Many years before the oil industry became a signifi-
cant one in the American economy, the policy of conserva-
tion of natural resources was a popular political plank.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 10-11.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Mather, "Oil Troubles the International Waters" New York Times
Magazine, Feb. 22, 1948, p. 38.
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The very words have a warming connotation. It is that
policy that has been perverted to the use of the oil industry.
Professor Rostow contends that there is no real threat of
exhausting American oil reserves in the immediate future.
There are many who disagree with him. Professor Mather
of Harvard, for example, states: "If present trends con-
tinue, the obvious deduction is that the United States in
ten to twenty years will be a 'have not' nation so far as
petroleum is concerned."' 4 Whichever view be the correct
one, however, it is clear that the oil companies have used
the slogan of conservation to cover up the fact of monopo-
listic price-fixing. The oil companies are able to maintain
their planned scarcity only with the aid of outmoded law
and the cooperation of the legislatures of the oil states and
the Bureau of Mines of the Department of the Interior.
The outmoded law is the "law of capture," long rejected
in the country of its origin, 5 that the person on whose land
oil is brought to the surface is the owner of the oil. It has
resulted in an inordinate number of wells being sunk, at
great cost in equipment and oil, since the greater the number
of wells, the greater the loss in gas pressure, causing a large
part of the oil to be left underground for lack of pressure
to pump oil through the rock formations. The states
have enacted laws restricting the number of wells in any
given area. But such laws have been honored more in their
breach than in their enforcement."6
Nominally for purposes of conservation, oil states have
enacted prorationing laws, limiting the amount of oil to be
brought to the surface in each state. It is important to note
that these prorationing laws did not receive their stimulus
until the depression caused a sharp decline in the demand for
gasoline. The prorationing statutes soon came under the
protecting wing of the "Blue Eagle" of the N.I.R.A. Today,
the prorationing system operates in this fashion: The Bu-
reau of Mines of the Department of the Interior, assuming a
demand, 7 sets a figure for the entire industry's production, at
14. Ibid.
15. Ely, "The Conservation of Oil" 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1244 (1938).
16. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" 36, n.68 (1948).
17. "The Bureau of Mines forecasts of demand depend on the con-
cealed premise of price stability. Their effect is to state how
much or how little crude oil need be produced to permit prices to
remain fixed." Id. at 27. "The Bureau of Mines estimates, the
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the same time allocating to each state its share of the quota.
States by way of compact-where more open monopoly prac-
tices are not adopted as in California-in turn ration each of
the wells in the state in order to approximate the quota as-
signed by the Bureau of Mines. The Federal Government co-
operates by banning from interstate commerce all oil pro-
duced in violation of the state prorationing statutes.18 Thus,
"by and large, the laws governing oil production are drawn
and sustained as conservation measures, however much the
stabilization of markets may have been the dominating fac-
tor in causing their enactment. It will be noted that the in-
dustry has not sought-indeed has intensely opposed-a pub-
lic utility status as the basis for these statutes."'19
As a matter of fact, any real effort toward conservation
would necessitate laws: (1) preventing flush flows; (2) lim-
iting the number of wells per field; (3) regulating the rate
of flow at each well to equalize the rate of pressure in the
field; (4) requiring a minimum ratio of gas to oil. None but
the first is accomplished by prorationing.20
" . . . If we were really serious about conserving our oil
supply, we would eliminate our oil tariff, we would use foreign
oil in peacetime, and perhaps have a holiday in one or
more areas of production, keeping the American extraction
industry as a model plant, and a standby for defense purposes;
we would mix gasoline with alchohol made from grain; and we
would discourage consumption by a horsepower tax, and per-
haps by a prohibition against using oil where coal or water
would do. But we are not really serious about oil conserva-
tion, and there isn't much objective ground for urging that
we should be. However, our public policy is loyal indeed to
the slogan of conservation. It is the supposed object of our
productive control system, as it is the moving idea which has
persuaded the Supreme Court and the public to condone our
present monopoly methods of determining supply."21
The prorationing system has successfully withstood at-
tacks on its constitutionality by individuals subjected to it.22
keystone of the entire plan, are without support in substantive
legislation." Id. at 29.
18. 49 Stat. 30 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §715 (1941).
19. Ely, "The Conservation of Oil" 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1224 (1938).
20. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" 34 (1948).
21. Id. at 33.
22. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573
(1940), 311 U.S. 570, 614 (1941); Champlin Refining Co. v. Cor-
poration Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
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Professor Rostow vividly condemns the Court's swallowing
the bitter pill of price-fixing because it was covered by a
sweet coating of conservation. He regards prorationing, in
the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, as a "glaring instance of
the taking of one man's property and giving it to another. ' 2
But just how far beyond the reasons set forth by a state le-
gislature a court may go is a question far beyond the scope
of this review or this book. Mr. Justice Holmes has said:
"While the courts may exercise a judgment of their own, it
by no means is true that every law is void which may seem
to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its osten-
sible end, or based upon a conception of morality with which
they disagree.1 24
The attack upon the prorationing system is the most
complicated and difficult point made in this book. On the
other hand, proof of the domination and control by the major
companies of transportation, refining, and distribution is
easily shown by Professor Rostow.
Professor Rostow's solution is two-fold. First, he would
eliminate the "rule of capture" and replace it with a legis-
lative requirement for unitary operation of the oil fields as
"the only course of action which as a practical matter could
permit high standards of conservation practice to be serious-
ly followed.1 25 Second, he would bring about competition in
the oil industry by means of an antitrust action resulting in
an appropriate decree.
Professor Rostow's faith in the Sherman Law rests upon
two recent decisions: United States v. Aluminum Company
of America 2 and American Tobacco Company v. United
States. 27 From these he draws his tests of monopoly: "Free-
dom of entry of new firms into a field is the key to the
economists' distinction between competitive and monopolistic
markets. . . . the crucial element of their monopolistic
power is a degree of control over the prices they charge. '25
Whether, in fact, Professor Rostow has correctly interpreted
these opinions remains to be demonstrated.
23. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 79-80(1937).
24. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608 (1903) (Italics Added).
25. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" 40 (1948).
26. 148 F.2d 416 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
27. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
28. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" 125 (1948).
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Armed with these two cases, and with the facts he has
presented, he is willing to do battle under the Sherman Law
against the oil companies. The hurdle of the large numbers
of defendants, he quickly surmounts with the aid of United
States v. Reading Co. 29 and United States v. Patten.30  "De-
vising a suitable dissolution decree in the light of these prin-
ciples presents no insuperable technical obstacles. The courts
can employ expert assistants as Special Masters in drafting
the decree, and as Receivers in carrying ib out."31 The fact
that one of the vital links in the indictment-the prorationing
system-is not only lawful, but in part state and federally
sponsored, is a hurdle he prefers to ignore.
These elements are legal ones, which may be overcome.
Professor Rostow recognizes one important psychological fac-
tor that is set against him, but which does not deter him from
choosing the course of litigation rather than legislation: "Al-
though the dissolution of monopolistic organizations is a fam-
iliar remedy in antitrust history, each new application of it
comes with a shock, and meets the natural unwillingness of
judges to do anything drastic except to words. '3 2
The tial courts have not been too kind to the Govern-
ment in the antitrust suits brought before them. The Alu-
minum case was decided in favor of the defendants in the
District Court.3 3 It took what was one of the greatest courts
in the country to overturn that decision. Similarly, a three-
judge court ruled in favor of the United States Gypsum Com-
pany.34 The Supreme Court, however, rectified that error
on March 8, 1948. United States v. Paramount Pictures,"
now on appeal before the Supreme Court, though resulting in
a finding of monopoly, ended in a decree denying dissolution.
Should the Supreme Court remove the scope of the decree
from the discretion of the District Court, and say that it will
order divorcement where in its judgment it believes it to be
appropriate, a vital link will be forged in Professor Rostow's
chain. At this writing, the Court has not yet so acted.
I agree with all that Professor Rostow sponsors in this
29. 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
30. 187 Fed. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
31. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" 140 (1948).
32. Id. at 140-141.
33. 44 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
34. 67 F.Supp. 397 (D. D.C. 1946).
35. 66 F.Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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book except his choice of remedy. Much is to be said for the
practicality of his choice. A reform by way of Administra-
tion sponsorship or legislative action would call for bold,
courageous action and there is no assurance that such will be
forthcoming. On the other hand, the Antitrust Division,
for the most part, is competently staffed and under able lea-
dership. An action against these oil companies has already
been started, and the course of that suit will probably be
guided by the Division rather than the Attorney General's
office. Thus, though a victory may not be assured in the
District Court, the possibility of success on appeal is good.
I submit, however, that the knife would be more effec-
tively wielded by Congress, first by amendment to the anti-
trust laws to make divorcement, in this case as in others,
a legislatively sponsored remedy; second to provide for the
supervision of oil production in accordance with conserva-
tion measures already covered. A tendency exists, of which
this book may be reflection among "liberal" groups today,
to turn for aid to the courts, and more specifically to the
Supreme Court. This same group suffered untold agonies
when the "Old Court," by construction of statutes or Con-
stitution, or other forms of "judicial legislation," destroyed
New Deal legislation. Today they seek the assistance of the
courts to effect results, opposite to those the "Old Court"
would effect, but by the same means. It is a program that
ignores the democratic flavor of the legislative and executive
branches of government in favor of the non-democratic courts.
(Non-democratic in method of appointment, not in their
philosophy.) I think that the appropriate answer has al-
ready been suggested: education of the public. "The con-
suming public has never become exercised to the point of
transferring the issues to an arena which it might dominate-
Congress."'3 It is probably a more naive answer, however,
than that offered by Professor Rostow.
Notwithstanding this difference of opinion with Pro-
fessor Rostow, this, the first of the studies in National Policy
to be promulgated by the Departments of Economics, Polit-
ical Science, and Law at Yale University, has set a standard
of excellence that the future .texts will find difficult to
achieve. (Its importance is enhanced for its demonstration
of the necessity of fusing law with economics and political
36. Ely, "The Conservation of Oil" 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1241 (1938).
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science for realistic consideration of legal problems.) It cer-
tainly should be sent to those in high places who might put it
to good use.
PHILIP B. KURLAND *
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STA-
TUTES. By Felix Frankfurter. New York: The As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York. 1947.
Pp. 29. $1.50.
It is not surprising that Mr. Justice Frankfurter chose as
his topic for the sixth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture
the reading of statutes. Federal judging today is almost ex-
clusively concerned with statutory material,' and- on this
subject the federal judge has become increasingly articulate,
not only because the Bar is in need of instruction on how to
treat problems of legislation, but also because the judge's
artistic urge, now that his creative common law function has
largely atrophied, is directed toward the interpretative.2
Thus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has "gone to great masters
to get a sense of their practice of the art of interpretation"3:
Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo.
Together with these three masters, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter himself has been an exponent of the new art. He has
done as much as any one else-in his opinions as well as in
this volume-to enunciate the modern doctrine of statutory
construction.
This doctrine-though it is doctrinaire to call it such-
is that a statute must be examined, in order to "accord the
words the sense in which Congress used them,' 4 in its
total context. The search for meaning in the words of a
statute does not differ from the same search in "a wider
non-legal context. Anything that is written may present a
problem of meaning, and that is the essence of the business
of judges in construing legislation . . . . The troublesome
M ember of the New York Bar.
1. Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 5(1947).
2. See Frank, "Words and Music: Some Reflections on Statutory
Interpretation" 47 Col. L. Rev. 1259 (1947).
3. Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 9(1947).
4. Id. at 16.
1948)
